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Abstract  
This paper attempts to address the question whether the signaling properties of credit spreads 
in Canada are useful for predicting future economic activity. This It extents Gilchrist, et al. 
(2009) paper “Credit Market Shocks and Economic Fluctuations: Evidence from Corporate 
Bond and Stock Markets” by examining the predictive power of credit spreads on corporate 
debt for future economic activity in Canada. In this paper, the credit spreads were constructed 
using monthly data on prices corporate bond traded over the 2002 -2017 period issued by 60 
Canadian corporations. Overall the results suggest that movements specific to credit markers 
account for a considerable fraction of volatility in Canadian economic activity during the 
period under study.  
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1: Introduction  
This paper aims to extent Gilchrist, et al. (2009) paper “Credit Market Shocks and Economic 
Fluctuations: Evidence from Corporate Bond and Stock Markets” by examining the predictive 
power of credit spreads on corporate debt for future economic activity in Canada. 
Gilchrist et al. [2009] find corporate bond spreads spearhead real activity on the footing of financial 
accelerator mechanisms, increase cyclicality or because they of their forward-looking nature. This 
paper re-examines this evidence using a broad array of credit spreads constructed directly from the 
secondary bond prices on outstanding debt issued by the companies in S&P/TSX 60. The 
relationship between real economic activity and financial market tightness was examined using data 
on 1043 corporate bonds between July 2002 and July 2017 
I am interested in this research question because research on the role of asset prices in economic 
fluctuations has focused on the information content of various corporate credit spreads. Credit 
spreads are the investors’ compensation for observable risks associated. The literature shows that 
the developments in corporate credit markets provide important information regarding the future 
course of economic activity and fluctuations of stock price. I would like to gauge the importance 
and the impact of credit spreads in predicting real economic activity in Canada.  
Two empirical methods are employed to assess the predictive power of credit spread in economic 
fluctuations. First, the paper re-examines the relationship between bond spreads and credit risk. 
Second, the analysis evaluates the predictive content of corporate bond spreads in credit-risk 
portfolios for measures of economic activity such as the growth of nonfarm payroll employment 
and industrial production, and examine the forecasting power of credit spreads as emphasized in 
the literature.  
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This paper is different from the Gilchrist et al. paper in the following ways. 1) This paper includes 
both financial and Non-financial market participants. 2) This paper analyzes the evidence from the 
corporate bond market only; equity market has not been taken into consideration. 3) Gilchrist et. 
al. use Expected Default Frequency constructed and marketed by the Moody’s/KMV Corporation 
(MKMV). Corporate and equity KMV model that Moody’s employs to both compute the 
probability of credit default and as part of their credit risk management system. The Distance to 
Default (DD) is market-based measure of corporate default risk based on Merton’s model. It 
measures both solvency risk and liquidity risk at the firm level. Gilchrist et al. examine the predictive 
power of credit spreads in the EDF-based bond portfolios and compare their forecasting 
performance—both in-sample and out-of-sample. Due to lack of access to KMV/Moody database, 
z-score were used as a proxy to default risk. (4) Gilchrist et al assess the impact on the 
macroeconomy of movements in credit spreads in their EDF-based bond portfolios within a 
structural factor augmented vector autoregression (FAVAR) framework. This empirical approach 
has not be used in this paper. 
Empirical results for Canada show that corporate spreads have predictive ability for economic 
activity. This inclines to reinforce the theory-based assertion that movements in credit spreads are 
successful in predicting near-term changes in real economic activity. This tends to support the 
theory-based assertion that rising risk premia capture tightening credit market conditions. The 
forecasting performance of the four credit spreads evaluated in this paper is significant. The 
strongest evidence in favor of the predictive ability and economic significance of credit spreads 
comes from the high yield investment corporate bonds. Two other credit spreads, the ‘Aaa 
Corporate Bond spread’ and the ‘Baa Corporate bond spread’, have predictive power for some 
measures of economic activity. Much of the predictive power of bond spreads for economic activity 
is embedded in securities issued by intermediate-risk rather than low-risk firms. Overall, the results 
imply that credit market shocks have contributed to Canadian economic fluctuations during the 
June 2002– July 2017 period. 
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the Literature Review. 
Section 3 discusses and summarizes the key characteristics of the underlying fixed-income security-
level data. Section 4 focuses on methodology and results for the statistical relationships between 
credit spread and Expected Probability of default. It also presents the results of the forecasting 
exercise. Section 5 states the results of robustness checks. Section 6 puts forward the limitation. 
Section 7 concludes. 
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2: Literature Review  
Financial instruments represent rights on the real economy and therefore the financial asset prices 
convey useful information for the state of the economy and risks to the economic outlook. Chan-
Lau and Ivaschenko [2002] argue that the financial markets are relatively efficient in reflecting new 
information in prices. In contrast, economic information is usually gathered and reported with 
considerable lags so it’s validated to use financial prices for forecasting purposes. Since prices of 
financial instruments embody the forward-looking information and are available at high 
frequencies, they have been expansively analysed as indicators of real economic activity and several 
of them have done well in the past.  
In particular, previous research on the role of asset pricing in predicting future economic conditions 
and in proliferating economic fluctuations has accentuated the information content of corporate 
credit spreads for market’s expectations about future economic development. The tremors in 
financial markets has always drawn attention to the imperative role of credit for real economic 
activity. 
The corporate spread is stated as the difference between the yields various corporate debt 
instruments and default risk-free benchmark securities of comparable maturity. This spread 
manifests a number of risks related with corporate bonds such as default risk, liquidity risk and tax 
risk amongst others. Default risk is evidently cyclical and disposed to increase before the onset of 
recessions, whereas it can be easily assumed liquidity and tax risks are relatively uncorrelated with 
business cycles. Many papers support this including Friedman and Kuttner [1993]; Duca [2000]; 
Chan-Lau and Ivaschenko [2002] and Kwark [2002]. 
In general, two questions are emphasized when exploring the behavior of credit markets as 
economic states change. They involve the recognition of shifts in credit outstanding and the reasons 
underlying changes in the composition of credit. When credit dwindles in a financial crisis the 
production of goods and services trails pattern. Though this process is sufficiently comprehended, 
there remains the significant question of whether the decline in aggregate credit is due to a decrease 
in the supply of credit, the demand for credit, or a combination of both. The other question pertains 
to the behavior of credit providers as the economic outlook changes. 
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According to Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist [1999], the upsurge in credit spreads reveal 
commotion in the supply of credit resulting from the weakening in the quality of corporate financial 
position or from the decline in the state of financial intermediaries that supply credit. A tightening 
in credit supply triggers asset values to fall, probability to default to increase, and yield spreads on 
private debt instruments to expand before economic downturns, as lenders want reparation for the 
anticipated rise in defaults. Furthermore, Philippon [2008] explains that the corporate bond spreads 
have the predictive content to exhibit a drop in economic fundamentals rooting from a descent in 
the expected present value of corporate cash flows prior to a cyclic depression. Philippon [2009] 
shows that a variation of Tobin’s q, which changes proportionately with a credit spread based on 
US corporate and government bond yields, predicts capital investment much better than the 
standard Tobin’s q based on equity prices. 
For assessing the information content of corporate credit spreads for economic activity, the 
maturity structure of the underlying credit instruments needs to be controlled tactfully. The maturity 
structure of corporate bond spread indexes such as the Aaa-Baa or high-yield spread is much longer. 
While, the paper-bill spreads are based on short maturity instruments commonly between one and 
six months. As expected, short-term credit instruments manifest near-term default risk, whereas 
longer-maturity instruments are suitable for encapsulating expectations about future economic 
conditions one to two years ahead, a forecast horizon generally related with business cycle 
fluctuations. Gilchrist, et al. [2009] advise that the accurate assessment of the predicting ability of 
credit spreads at market state frequencies necessitates careful focus to the maturities of bonds used 
to create credit spreads. 
Bleaney et al. [2012] have provided strong support for the Gilchrist et al. [2009] and Gilchrist and 
Zakrajšek [2012] model using data from outside the United States.  They argue that bond spreads 
are strong predictors of financial market tension and can forecast fluctuations in economic 
movement in Europe for a range of conditions They contrasted the extrapolative content of the 
corporate bond spreads and the excess bond premium in single countries inside and outside the 
Euro Area. They concluded that only the core European countries have comparable forecasting 
content in the bond spreads. Other countries in the Euro Area, and the UK, do not have 
comparable forecasting content in the bond spreads. They also concluded that the spread is 
significant even after the inclusion of other indicators of economic confidence and sentiment to 
control for anticipated changes in real economic activity. 
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Zhang [2002], analyzing Canadian data, finds that credit spreads dominate the term spread, federal 
funds rate, paper-bill spread, stock market movements, consumer sentiment index, and shifts in the 
Conference Board leading indicator in terms of output forecasts up to one year ahead, both in-
sample and out-of-sample. 
For the predictive ability of credit spread for forecasting macroeconomic conditions, the empirical 
success of this stratum of research is substantial. However, results differ considerably across diverse 
financial assets underlying the credit spreads under analysis as well as through various time periods.  
For instance, the support for the tendency of the paper-bill spread, difference between the 
respective interest rates on commercial paper and comparable maturity T-bills, to widen shortly 
before the inception of recessions and to narrow again before recoveries is thoroughly documented 
(Friedman and Kuttner [1993]; Gilchrist, et al. [2009]; Guidolin and Tam [2010]).  
It is important to consider that some papers have set forth that the paper-bill spread has lost much 
of its forecasting power since the early 1990s. According to Thoma and Gray [1998] and Emery 
[1999], the forecasting gist of the paper-bill spread may indicate one-time occurrences.  
Friedman and Kuttner [1998] argue that the paper–bill spread did not predict the 1990–1991 
recession and provide two key reasons for this digression from past experience. Firstly, the paper–
bill spread’s role as a barometer of monetary policy gives it signalling ability for market expectations 
and business cycle fluctuations. But then the 1990–1991 recession was not immediately triggered 
by tight monetary policy. The second explanation is that a few years just earlier than the 1990–1991 
recession, movements of the spread were significantly affected by changes in the relative quantities 
of T-bills, commercial paper and bank CDs that happened for reasons extraneous to the business 
cycle. This second predict finding underlines the problems related with using relative interest rate 
relationships as business cycle indicators.  
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It is important to note that they have assembled evidence in their paper that, claim to a certain 
extent in the case of commercial paper and T-bills, changes in asset quantities affect interest rate 
spreads. Some changes in asset quantities take place due to business cycle frequencies, while others 
do not, but both types of changes influence the corresponding spreads. When using any particular 
interest rate spread to predict business fluctuations, one should be sensitive to the chance of 
idiosyncratic movements in the corresponding asset quantities and consequently making due 
allowance for those movements if they are present to avoid mistakes. Thus, in this aspect at least, 
interest rate spreads have much in mutual with other classes of business cycle indicators. 
Past studies such as Ng and Wright (2013) find, analyzing US data, the predictive ability of the credit 
spread to improve markedly while that of the term spread disappears altogether in the latter part of 
the 1985-2012 sample period. They infer that the increased forecasting performance of the credit 
spread may outcome of the extensive growth of the financial sector relative to the other sectors of 
the US economy in shaping the US business cycle during the 1990s up to the early 2000s and due 
to higher leverage.  
In contrast, according to Gertler and Lown [1999], yield spreads based on indexes of high yield 
corporate bonds have done remarkably well at projecting output growth during the last decade. 
They used quarterly data to compare the in-sample forecasts from the high-yield spread and other 
variables to substantiate the predictive power of the high-yield bond spread.  Mody and Taylor 
[2004] have also supported this finding. Duca (1999) points out that the conclusion of the 
experiment mainly depends on the downfall of the high-yield bond market in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, which could be accidental. 
Chan-Lau and Ivaschenko [2001, 2002] illustrate the predictive power of the investment-grade 
spread. Saito and Takeda [2000] find that the corporate term structure of AAA-rated bonds 
outperformed the treasury term structure in both in-sample and out-of-sample forecasting.  They 
concluded that AAA corporate yield had valuable information about the probability of recession. 
Krishnamurthy and Muir (2015) realize that credit spreads conjoined with information about pre-
crisis credit growth forecast the gravity of financial crises. 
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To sum up, for the periods of credit market mayhem, credit spread, due to their forward-looking 
content, are particularly informative of linkages between the real and financial sides of economy.  
Movements in corporate spread can impart initial warning signals for such economic downturns 
and can be applied to assess the level of strains in financial markets. Stein (2014) discusses that 
observing credit spreads is important for making good decisions on monetary policy. Curdia and 
Woodford (2011) postulate theoretical support that in a slow economy, central bank can offset a 
mounting credit spread with easing monetary policy. They state that an adjustment for changes in 
credit spreads can better the standard Taylor rule, however the appropriate size of adjustments is 
subject to the source of the change in credit spreads.  
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3: Data  
The analysis is based on the significant information that comes from a large sample of fixed income 
securities issued by Canadian corporations. Specifically, for a sample of 60 publicly traded firms 
covered by the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), daily market prices of their 
outstanding long-term corporate bonds were drawn from the WRDS Trace databases. The two data 
sources include market prices for a significant fraction of dollar-denominated bonds publicly issued 
in the Canadian corporate cash market. The Trace database is a data source of daily bond prices 
that starts in July 2002.  
The credit spread at each point in time was calculating by matching the yield on each individual 
security issued by the firm to the estimated yield on the Treasury security of the same maturity. The 
month-end Treasury yields were taken from the Canadian Socio-economic Information and 
Management System Database (CANSIM). 
To minimize the effect of outliers, the analysis excludes all observations with credit spreads greater 
than 5,000 basis points and smaller than 10 basis points. Furthermore, issues with a par value of 
less than $10,000 were excluded from observation as such small issues are likely badgered by 
considerable liquidity concerns. These selection criteria yielded a sample of 1,043 individual 
securities, covering the period from July 2002 to July 2017.   
Table 1: Summary Statistics for Selected Bond Characteristics  
Bond Characteristic Mean SD Min Max 
Term to Maturity(years) 8.27 4.28 1 20 
Duration (years) 5.81 1.93 0.06 18.7 
S&P Quality Rating - - C A+ 
Market Value ($mil.) 57 121 0.1 733 
Coupon Rate(pct.) 4.39 2.34 0 15.4 
Annualized Yield(pct.) 3.96 3.37 0.494 51.35 
Credit Spread (bps)1 103.8 7.45 10.02 4831 
Panel Dimensions 
Observations: 13681 N= 1043Bonds 
                                                     
1 Measured relative to comparable maturity Treasury yield 
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Table 1 contains summary statistics for the selected characteristics of bonds in the sample. The 
maturity of these debt instruments is fairly long, the average term-to-maturity is about 8.27 years. 
Because corporate bonds typically generate significant cash flow in the form of regular coupon 
payments, the effective duration is considerably shorter, averaging about 5.81 years over the sample 
period. Though the sample spans the spectrum of credit quality from “single C” to “A+”—the 
median bond/month observation, at BBB, is still in the investment-grade category. The coupon 
rate on the sample of bonds averaged 4.39 percent during the sample period, and the average total 
return, as measured by the annualized yield, was 3.96 percent per annum. The distribution of the 
market values of the bonds in the sample range from $1 million to nearly $733 million.  
A fraction of observed credit spreads manifests compensation required by investors for tolerating 
the risk that a firm who issued the bonds will default on its payment obligations. To measures this 
firm-specific likelihood of default at each point in time, Altman Z score was used a proxy for 
Expected Default Risk for the non-financial companies and the quarterly data for the sample firms 
was retrieved from the Bloomberg Terminal.  
The z-score for manufacturing firms was calculated as; 
Z-Score = ([Working Capital / Total Assets] x 1.2) + ([Retained Earnings / Total Assets] x 1.4) + 
([Operating Earnings / Total Assets] x 3.3) + ([Market Capitalization / Total Liabilities] x 0.6) + 
([Sales / Total Assets] x 1.0) 
The z-score for non-manufacturing firms was calculated as; 
Z-Score = ([Working Capital / Total Assets] x 1.2) + ([Retained Earnings / Total Assets] x 1.4) + 
([Operating Earnings / Total Assets] x 3.3) + ([Market Capitalization / Total Liabilities] x 0.6) 
The papers that support the use of the bank z-score for evaluating the stability of financial 
institutions and predictive bankruptcy risk which the banks are exposed to include Boyd and Runkle 
(1993); Demirguc-Kunt, Detragiache, and Tressel (2008); Laeven and Levine (2009); Poli, 
Chiaramonte, and Croci, (2015). Its accuracy level has been validated by the empirical research 
carried out in the Italian banking system (Altman, Danovi and Falini [2012]), the French banking 
system (Lepetit and Strobel [2014]), the Islamic banking system (Cihak and Hesse[ 2008]).  
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Bank Z-score matches a bank's buffers, i.e. capitalization and returns, with the volatility of the 
returns. It is estimated as (ROA+(equity/assets))/sd(ROA) where sd(ROA) denotes the standard 
deviation of ROA. 
As a measure of financial stability, perhaps the main limitation is that the z-scores are based purely 
on accounting data. They are thus only as good as the underlying accounting and auditing 
framework. An advantage of using z-score is that it can be also used for companies for which more 
refined, market based data are not available. Furthermore, the z-scores allow matching the risk of 
default in different groups of institutions.  
The bond credit ratings were extracted from the WRDS Trace Master database but were not used 
because ratings were annual and z-scores have proved to be one of the most reliable predictors of 
financial distress.  Enron's Z-Score was equivalent to its BBB bond rating at year-end 1999. But in 
June 20012, Enron had a z-score equal to a B whereas the rating agencies had rated Enron as BBB 
just before it filed for bankruptcy. 
To examine the predictive power of credit spread, Nonfarm payroll employment (EMP) and 
monthly index of industrial production (IP) published monthly by Statistics Canada are used to 
gauge the state of the economy. 
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4: Methodology and Results 
4.1 Default Risk and Credit Spread 
This Section focuses on the relationship between bond spreads and default risk. The cross-sectional 
heterogeneity of data has been examined by splitting into credit-spread portfolios sorted by the 
bond issuer’s ex-ante projected probability of default (high, intermediate and low risk) and the 
bond’s residual term-to-maturity. To control for maturity, the bond credit spreads were split into 
four maturity categories: (1) Short maturity: credit spreads of bonds with the remaining term-to-
maturity of less than to 3 years; (2) Intermediate maturity: credit spreads of bonds with the 
remaining term-to-maturity of more than (or equal) 3 years but less than 7 years; (3) Long maturity: 
credit spreads of bonds with the remaining term-to-maturity of more than (or equal) 7 years but 
less than to 15 years; (4) Very long maturity: credit spreads of bonds with the remaining term-to-
maturity of more than (or equal) 15 years.  
Then, an arithmetic average of credit spreads in month t for each maturity portfolio and an 
arithmetic average of excess equity returns in month t for each maturity portfolio was computed. 
The following time series regression between credit spread and expected default risk was estimated 
Rit=αi + βiPDi, t-1 + ϵit 
Where Rit denotes the average credit spread in month t and PDi, t-1 denotes the expected probability 
of default at the end of month t-1.  
 As evidenced by the entries in Table 2, there is a strong positive relationship between measures of 
default risk based on the information from the corporate bond market. For non-financial firms, the 
estimates of the coefficients associated with the average PD in each maturity group are statistically 
significant at conventional levels for two out of four maturity based portfolios. For Financial firms, 
the estimates of the coefficients associated with the average PD in each maturity group are 
statistically significant at conventional levels for three out of four maturity based portfolios.   
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Table 2: Relationship between Credit Spreads and Expected Default Risk (By Maturity)  
SHORT MATURITY (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) CORPORATE BONDS 
VARIABLE NONFINANCIAL FINANCIAL 
CONSTANT -.7764287 0.6369846 
(12.02) (2.00 ) 
PD t-1 .3601016 .0362435 
(2.85) (6.73 ) 
Adj R-squared 0.2371 0.0755 
INTERMEDIATE MATURITY ( 3 to 7 YEARS) CORPORATE BONDS 
VARIABLE NONFINANCIAL FINANCIAL 
CONSTANT .2804909 -.1308427 
(0.45) (5.35) 
PD t-1 -.0002689 .0012613 
(1.0.1) (2.19) 
Adj R-squared 0.0000 0.0015 
LONG MATURITY ( 7 to 15 YEARS) CORPORATE BONDS 
VARIABLE NONFINANCIAL FINANCIAL 
CONSTANT .98832225 -.0884604 
(6.27) (3.82) 
PD t-1 . 2011112 .0250413 
(2.87) (26.67 ) 
Adj R-squared 0.0014 0.3733 
VERY LONG MATURITY  (MORE THAN 15 YEARS) CORPORATE BONDS 
VARIABLE NONFINANCIAL FINANCIAL 
CONSTANT 1.378309 .0630297 
(1.87) (0.63) 
PD t-1 -.1465656 .0162979 
 (0.66) (6.47) 
Adj R-squared 0.0000 0.0763 
Note: Sample Period Monthly data from July 2002 to August 2017 (T=205). Dependent variable in each regression is the average 
credit spread in month t. Absolute T-statistics are reported in Brackets. Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroscedasticity 
Constant variance and Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of spread were used for robustness of the model. 
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With regards to expected probability of default, the bond credit spreads were split into three 
categories; high risk, intermediate risk and low risk. Lepetit and Strobe [2013] find that if z score>3, 
the firm is situated in the safe zone, it is financially healthy and the level of risk is low. If the score 
is between 1.8 and 3, the firm is situated in the grey zone and the level of risk is intermediate. A 
score of less than and equal to 1.8 involves high level of risk and the firm is situated in the distress 
zone. A higher z-score therefore implies a lower probability of insolvency.  The sample had no 
observation with Z-score less than or equal to 1.8.  
Table 3 contains the results of time series regression of monthly bond spreads in intermediate and 
low risk categories.  In the credit-risk dimension, the PD explain the least variation in credit spreads 
of portfolios containing bonds issued by least risky firms, characterized by high Altman Z-scores. 
The explanatory power of the PDs also diminish somewhat for portfolios for longer maturity 
bonds. Although estimates of the coefficients associated with the average PD in each intermediate-
risk portfolio are statistically significant at conventional levels for three out of four maturity based 
portfolios, they are economically small and movements in PD explain very less time-series variation 
in credit spread across the spectrum of credit quality.  
This finding suggest that for the bonds under consideration the corporate spread is related to 
systematic movements in expected default risk within intermediate risk categories. The estimated 
coefficients, on average, are statistically significant; an indication the relationship holds across the 
cross-sectional distribution of credit risk as well the maturity of corporate debt instruments. 
However, the explanatory power of the PD diminish somewhat for portfolios for longer maturity 
bonds. 
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Table 3: Relationship between Credit Spreads and Expected Default Risk (By Credit Risk) 
      SHORT MATURITY (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) CORPORATE BONDS 
VARIABLE Intermediate Risk Low Risk 
CONSTANT .800781 (no observation) 
(12.38 )  
PD t-1 .3180864  
(2.57)  
Adj R-squared 0.2102  
INTERMEDIATE MATURITY ( 3 to 7 YEARS) CORPORATE BONDS 
 VARIABLE Intermediate Risk Low Risk 
CONSTANT .066451 -.019979 
(1.05) (0.09) 
PD t-1 -.0778496 . 0369288 
(2.56) (0.46) 
Adj R-squared 0.086 0.0000 
LONG MATURITY ( 7 to 15 YEARS) CORPORATE BONDS 
 VARIABLE   Intermediate Risk Low Risk 
CONSTANT .9819179 1.411852 
(5.26) 4.92 
PD t-1 .1557741 -.086167 
(1.83) (0.72) 
Adj R-squared 0.07 0.0005 
VERY LONG MATURITY ( MORE THAN 15 YEARS) CORPORATE 
BONDS 
VARIABLE Intermediate Risk Low Risk 
CONSTANT 2.596381 .9303818 
(4.70) (0.66) 
PD t-1 -.6063996 .0305801 
(3.24) (0.08) 
Adj R-squared 0.0964 0.0000 
Note: Sample Period Monthly data from July 2002 to August 2017 (T=205). Dependent variable in each regression is the average 
credit spread in month t. Absolute T-statistics are reported in Brackets. 
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4.2 Credit Spreads and Economic Activity 
This section studies the predictive power of credit spreads in the bonds sample with several 
commonly used credit spread indexes and compare their forecasting performance in-sample and 
out-of-sample. 
First, the two measures of economic activity were projected the following bivariate Vector auto 
regression (VAR), supplemented with two sets of credit spreads: 
∇EMPt+h = β0 + β1i∇EMPt−i + β2i∇IPt−i + η′1Z1t + η′2Z2t + ε1, t+h (1)  
∇IPt+h = γ0 + γ1i∇EMPt−i + γ2i∇IPt−i + θ′1Z1t + θ′2Z2t + ε2, t+h (2) 
In the VAR forecasting system given by equations 1–2, , Z1t denotes a vector of standard credit 
spreads indexes, Z2t denotes a vector of credit spreads associated with bonds in the sample and ε1, 
t+h and ε2, t+h are the forecast errors. 
The vector Z1t consists of four credit spread indexes which have been used considerably to forecast 
real economic activity. This set of standard credit spread indexes captures the information content 
of default-risk indicators at both short and long horizons by incorporating a paper-bill spread along 
with spreads on long-term corporate bonds. The four credit spread indexes used are as follows; (1) 
Paper-bill spread: the difference between the yield on 1-month nonfinancial AA-rated commercial 
paper and the yield on the Canada 1-month Treasury bill; (2) Aaa corporate bond spread: the 
difference between the yield on an index of seasoned long-term Aaa-rated corporate bonds and the 
yield on the Canada 10-Year Treasury note; (3) Baa corporate bond spread: the difference between 
the yield on an index of seasoned long-term Baa-rated corporate bonds and the yield on the Canada 
10-Year Treasury note; and (4) high-yield corporate bond spread: the difference between the yield 
on an index of long-term speculative-grade corporate bonds and the yield on the Canada 10-Year 
Treasury note. 
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Table 4: Results of Panel VAR 
 
Note: Each VAR specification includes 11 lags of ∆EMP and ∆IP. See Appendix A for Separate VAR for financial and nonfinancial 
firms. The results are consistent. 
 
As evidenced by the p-values reported in Table 4, both the standard credit spread indexes and 
corporate spread are statistically significant predictors of Employment Growth and Industrial 
Production growth.  
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4.2.1 IN-SAMPLE FORECASTING 
This section examines the in-sample predictive power of various credit spreads for the selected two 
measures of economic activity. Specifically, for each forecast horizon h, the forecasting VAR given 
in equations 1 and 2 is estimated using all available data. Then the h-month ahead growth rates of 
nonfarm payroll employment and industrial production and the associated forecast errors were 
calculated. To quantify the in-sample forecasting performance of the VAR specifications, the square 
root of the mean squared forecast error in percentage points (RMSFE) for each specification has 
been reported. 
 In both risk cases, Table 5 reports p-values associated with the Wald exclusion tests on the two 
sets of credit spreads along with the explanatory power of each forecasting equation as measured 
by the Adjusted R-squared. 
Table 5: Predictive Content of Credit Spreads for Economic Activity 
Nonfarm Employment (EMP) Industrial Production (IP) Credit Spreads Overall 
 P>chi2 Adj R2 P>chi2 Adj R2 Pr>W1 Pr>W2 Pr>W 
Low Risk 0.0001 0.9252 0.0000 0.9868 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Intermediate 
Risk 
0.0000 0.9163 0.0000 0.9110 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Note:  Each VAR specification includes 11 lags of ∆EMP and ∆IP. Pr > W1 denotes the p-value for the Wald test of the null 
hypothesis that coefficients on the set of standard credit spread indexes are jointly equal to zero; Pr > W2 denotes the p-value for 
the robust Wald test of the null hypothesis that coefficient on credit spreads in equal to zero. Pr>W denotes the p-value for the 
Wald Test of the null hypothesis that coefficients are jointly equal to zero. 
The upper panel of Table 6 contains the results of this exercise for the short-run forecast horizon 
(3 and 6 months), whereas the lower panel contains results for the long-run forecast horizon (20 
months). It reports RMSFE associated with each forecast along with the adjusted R2. 
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Table 6: In-sample Predictive Content of Credit Spreads for Economic Activity 
Note: Sample Period:  Monthly Data from August 2014 to March 2017. Dependable variables in the VAR specification are ∆EMP 
t+h and ∆IP t+h, where h is the forecast horizon.  
As evidenced by the MSFE reported in the Table 6, both the standard credit spread indexes and 
credit spreads are significant predictors of Employment Growth and Industrial Production Growth 
at that the short time horizon. The lower panel of Table 3 examines the in-sample explanatory 
power of credit spreads at the 20-month horizon. At this longer horizon, the information content 
of credit spreads for both measures of economic activity is considerable. In the case of nonfarm 
payroll employment, for example, standard credit spread indexes explain 68 percent of the variation 
in the 20-month ahead growth rate of nonfarm payroll employment.  The results of these 
forecasting exercises indicate that the information content of credit spreads is concentrated in the 
low risk categories. 
Forecast Horizon h=3 
Nonfarm Employment (EMP) Industrial Production (IP) 
 RMSFE Adj R2 RMSFE Adj R2 
Low Risk 0.01 0.9533  0.03  0.9954 
Intermediate Risk 0.02 0.8531  0.1 0.9364 
Forecast Horizon h=6 
Nonfarm Employment (EMP) Industrial Production (IP) 
 RMSFE Adj R2 RMSFE Adj R2 
Low Risk 0.02 0.7087  0.07  0.9189 
Intermediate Risk 0.04 0.6028  0.17 0.8320 
Forecast Horizon h=20 
Nonfarm Employment (EMP) Industrial Production (IP) 
 RMSFE Adj R2 RMSFE Adj R2 
Low Risk 0.07 0.5755  0.25  0.5211 
Intermediate Risk 0.09 0.6815  0.32 0.5305 
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4.2.2 OUT-OF-SAMPLE FORECASTING 
This section analyzes the out-of-sample predictive power of credit spreads for the selected two 
measures of economic activity using pseudo out-of-sample forecasts. To quantify the out-of-sample 
forecasting performance of the VAR specifications, the square root of the mean squared forecast 
error in percentage points (RMSFE) for each specification has been reported in Table 7. 
Table 7: Out-of-sample Predictive Content of Credit Spreads for Economic Activity 
Note: Sample Period:  Monthly Data from August 2014 to December 2015. Dependable variables in the VAR specification are 
∆EMP t+h and ∆IP t+h, where h is the forecast horizon.  
The results reported in Table 7 signify that corporate spread have predictive power for the selected 
two measures of economic activity.  
Forecast Horizon h=6 
Nonfarm Employment (EMP) Industrial Production (IP) 
 RMSFE Adj R2 RMSFE Adj R2 
Low Risk 0.04 0.6057  0.11  0.7547 
Medium Risk 0.03 0.7378  0.11 0.8051 
Forecast Horizon h=12 
Nonfarm Employment (EMP) Industrial Production (IP) 
 RMSFE Adj R2 RMSFE Adj R2 
Low Risk 0.05 0.5354  0.17  0.7056 
Medium Risk 0.06 0.7095  0.15 0.7776 
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5: Robustness Checks  
 This cross-sectional analysis covers the time period from July 2002 to August 2017.  The data set is 
weakly balanced if each panel doesn’t contain the same time points. For instance, a company in 
the sample have issued first debt instrument in 2004. Panels are said to be strongly balanced if each 
panel contains the same time point. For example, if we did not have Debt instrument for firm for 
2002 but have data for 2004 and onwards, xtset would indicate that the data have a gap. This limited 
the post-estimation testing in STATA as Hadri Lagrange, Levin-Lin-Chu Fisher-type test (based on 
augmented Dickey-Fuller tests) for unit root required strongly balanced data. 
5.1 Stability test 
Hamilton [1994] and Lutkepohl [2005] find that a VAR model is stable if all moduli of the 
companion matrix are strictly less than one. The stability condition of the estimated panel VAR was 
checked. The resulting table and graph of eigenvalues confirms that the estimate is stable. 
Table 8: Stability Test Results 
 
This stability implies that the panel VAR is invertible and has an infinite-order vector moving-
average representation. Thus, it can impart interpretation to estimated impulse-response functions 
and forecasting. 
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5.2 Granger Causality Wald test 
Table 9: Granger Causality Test Results 
 
Results of the Granger causality tests below show that nonfarm payroll employment growth and 
other variable in the panel VAR Granger-causes industrial production. Likewise, industrial 
production and other variables Granger-causes nonfarm payroll employment growth at the usual 
confidence levels. 
5.3 Lag Order Selection  
The panel VAR lag order selection on estimation sample was ran.  
Table 10: Lag Order Selection 
 
Eleventh-order panel VAR has the minimum Hansen’s J statistic. Eleventh-order panel VAR is the 
preferred model, since it has the smallest MBIC, MAIC and MQIC, based on the selection criteria 
by Andrews and Lu [2001]. 
                                                          
                     ALL     2376.028    1        0.000   
              emp_growth     2376.028    1        0.000   
   ip_growth                                              
                                                          
                     ALL       51.924    1        0.000   
               ip_growth       51.924    1        0.000   
   emp_growth                                             
                                                          
     Equation \ Excluded      chi2     df   Prob > chi2   
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6: Limitations  
There are four concerns, in this analysis and findings, regarding the predictive power of credit 
spreads for future forecast.  
First, the analysis is based on data from 2002. One could argue that the lack of historical data 
limits the strength of the conclusion. A longer sample with more business cycles would make 
the conclusion more convincing. Nevertheless, that the importance of the credit spreads 
comes from their information content on expected long-term credit risks, which is not 
provided by other financial market indicators. This endorses its value to conventional leading 
indicators such as the term spread and the federal funds rate. 
Second, Duca (1999) argues that the credit spreads occasionally transmit false signals when 
financial markets are under pressure. The Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) hedge 
fund crisis is one example. The strained financial markets widened credit spreads in 1998, but 
economic growth did not decelerate in 1999. It would be interesting to carry out empirical 
research to determine that the predictive power of the credit spreads is strong even in the 
presence of false alarms. 
Third, this paper doesn’t completely replicate the Gilchrist et al. model. 
Lastly, since there are several bonds issued by one firm, the firm-specific risk in error term 
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7: Conclusion  
The useful predictive content of the credit spreads signify that they have the capability to help 
private investors and central bankers to convalesce their output forecasts.  In comparison to 
non-financial leading indicators, credit spreads are accessible real-time on a daily basis. In 
comparison to information from the stock market, credit spreads are much less volatile. 
Empirical results for Canada show that corporate spreads have predictive ability for economic 
activity. This inclines to reinforce the theory-based assertion that movements in credit spreads 
are successful in predicting near-term changes in real economic activity. The results show that 
the relationship between default risk and credit spread holds across the cross sectional 
distribution of credit risk as well the maturity of corporate debt instruments. The predictive 
content of corporate bond spreads in credit-risk portfolios for measures of economic activity, 
such as the growth of nonfarm payroll employment and industrial production, is considerable. 
Much of the predictive power of bond spreads for economic activity is embedded in securities 
issued by intermediate-risk rather than low-risk firms. The results imply that credit market 
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Appendices  
Appendix A: Segregated PVAR  
A1: PVAR for Financial Firms 
 
 Table 11: Results for PVAR of Financial Firms 
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A2: PVAR for Non-Financial Firms 
 
Table 12: Results for PVAR of Financial Firms 
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Appendix B: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition  
 
 
Table 12: Results for FEVD 
Based on the FEVD (Forecast Error Variance Decomposition) estimates, we see that as much as 
33 percent of variation in growth in Industrial Production can be explained by growth in nonfarm 
payroll employment. On the other hand, growth in Industrial Production explain only 0.14 percent 
of variation in growth in nonfarm payroll employment. 
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Appendix C: Impulse-Response Function 
 
 
Figure 1: Results for Impulse-Response Function 
 
 
Confidence bands are estimated using Gaussian approximation based on Monte Carlo drawn from 
the estimated panel VAR model. In terms of levels, the IRF plot shows that a positive shock on 
employment growth leads to increased industrial production. A positive shock on industrial 
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Figure 2a and 2b: In-Sample Forecasting (h=6 months and low risk category) 
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Figure 3a and 3b: In-sample forecasting (h=20 months and Intermediate-Risk Category) 
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Appendix E: Out-of-Sample Forecasting 
 
 
Figure 4a and 4b: Out-of-sample forecasting (h=6 months and Low-Risk Category) 
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Figure 5a and 5b:  Out-of-sample forecasting (h=12 months and Low-Risk Category) 
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Appendix F: PVAR with exclusion of set of credit indexes 
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